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BRINGING A TITLE VII ACTION: WHICH TEST
REGARDING STANDING TO SUE IS THE
MOST APPLICABLE?
I. Introduction
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.2 Possibly
the most important general statute concerning employment discrimi-
nation,3 Title VII was enacted by Congress to ensure equality of em-
ployment opportunities by eliminating those practices that
discriminate on the above-mentioned bases.4
Because Congress designed the statute to eliminate the inconven-
ience, unfairness and humiliation of certain types of employment dis-
crimination,5 ambiguities are resolved in favor of the complaining
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)) [hereinafter Title VII or Act].
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII covers discrimination based on these factors
only. It does not cover discrimination based on non-citizenship or homosexuality. Em-
ployment discrimination based on age is prohibited under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-201, § 2, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982)).
3. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 5.10 at 2-2 (1988) [hereinafter
LARSON].
4. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, Chief Justice Burger's
opinion explained that an employer may violate Title VII even when acting in good faith.
Focusing on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), he stated:
[t]he objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the lan-
guage of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of
white employees over other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or
tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be main-
tained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employ-
ment practices.
Id. at 429-30. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468 (1982); Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). See also SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION § 2.1 at 35 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION]
("Most obviously, the prohibition of discrimination reflects society's commitment to ra-
cial and gender equality .... Title VII takes a step towards equality by prohibiting une-
qual treatment in the sense that it proscribes employment decisions resulting from an
intent to discriminate. This sense of discrimination has come to be called disparate
treatment.").
5. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1970). See 110
CONG. REC. 13090 (daily ed. June 9, 1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (in discussing
the minimum number of employees necessary for the statute to govern the employer's
practices, Sen. Humphrey stated that the principle of the statute is "fairness that is so
morally and ethically correct that its validity should long ago have been universally
recognized.").
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party.6 This approach reflects not only the "manifest importance of
Title VII rights to complaining parties, but also the broad national
commitment to eliminating such discrimination and the importance
of private suits in fulfilling that commitment."7
The courts, however, have faced considerable confusion as to whom
the Act protects. Most courts have held that since Title VII is a reme-
dial statute,8 its provisions are to be liberally construed.9 Such broad
construction has resulted in several interpretations of the provision
that defines "employee."" ° Moreover, controversy stems from what
relationship must exist between an "employer" and "employee" in or-
der for Title VII to apply.
Notwithstanding the language, purposes and goals of the Act, some
courts have narrowed the extent of protection under Title VII by bar-
ring certain individuals from bringing suit." For example, several
courts 2 have limited plaintiff status by using common law principles
of agency and declaring certain individuals to be independent contrac-
tors. 1 3 Liability attaches if the agent is an employee, but not if he is an
independent contractor. In order to state a cognizable claim under
Title VII, these courts require an immediate employer-employee rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and the defendant.
Other courts have turned away from the common law meaning of
6. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 461 (5th Cir. 1970).
7. Coles v. Penny, 531 F.2d 609, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
8. E.g., Craig v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 581 F.2d 189, 193 (8th
Cir. 1978); Hart v. J.T. Baker Chem. Co., 598 F.2d 829, 831 (3d Cir. 1979); Silver v.
KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 1978); Bell v. Brown, 557 F.2d 849, 853 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Davis v. Valley Distrib. Co., 522 F.2d 827, 833 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1090 (1977); EEOC v. Eagle Iron Works, 367 F. Supp. 817, 820 (S.D. Iowa
1973).
9. E.g., Quijano v. University Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1980);
Hart v. J.T. Baker Chem. Co., 598 F.2d 829, 831 (3d Cir. 1979); Craig v. Department of
Health, Educ. & Welfare, 581 F.2d 189, 193 (8th Cir. 1978); Bell v. Brown, 557 F.2d 849,
853 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Davis v. Valley Distrib. Co., 522 F.2d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977); Hauck v. Xerox Corp., 493 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1980),
aff'd, 649 F.2d 859 (3d Cir. 1981). See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2401.
10. Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336 (6th Cir. 1983).
11. American Federation of Gov't Employees v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496, 504-05 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 927 (1978).
12. Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d
1054 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1076 (1979). See EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co.,
713 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1983); Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
13. Spirides, 613 F.2d at 829; Smith, 410 F. Supp. at 518. See Cobb v. Sun Papers,
Inc., 673 F.2d 337 (1 1th Cir.)(where the court ruled that a janitor was an independent
contractor and, therefore, beyond the protection of the statute), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874
(1982); Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1980) (musician
hired by school district to give concert was an independent contractor).
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employee and instead look to the "economic realities"' 4 of the total
situation and the underlying relationship between the individual and
the principal. 5 This method considers the potential for employment
discrimination arising from the principal's economic dominance of
the relation. The greater the dependency, the more likely the court
will find the plaintiff to be an employee. This approach would apply
Title VII to any circumstance where an individual was dependent on
the employer's business for his livelihood, notwithstanding the ab-
sence of employer control necessary for Title VII to apply under the
common law or hybrid tests.
A few circuits have allowed a cause of action even after concluding
that the plaintiff is not an employee. 16 These courts have extended the
reach of Title VII beyond the traditional employer-employee relation-
ship by focusing upon whether the defendant can interfere with that
individual's employment opportunities. 17 These courts extend Title
VII's protection to a claim that the defendant interfered with an indi-
vidual's employment relationship with a third party.'" This rationale
is based on the language of Title VII's basic antidiscrimination provi-
sion, which makes it unlawful "to discriminate against any
individual."9
This Note examines who is a proper plaintiff under Title VII and
explains the need for a clearer definition of "employee" and "em-
ployed." Part II presents a historical development of the standards
used to define employment relationships in Title VII. Part III dis-
cusses the general requirements for standing and sets forth the tests
currently used to determine standing for a Title VII action. Part IV
analyzes how the tests can produce different outcomes and why some
tests more adequately serve the Act's goals. The Note concludes that
Congress should amend the definition of "employee" or at least define
what constitutes "employed." In the alternative, a consistent method
should be used and this Note proposes a two-part test that would suf-
fice for standing: (1) the claimant must first demonstrate that the de-
fendant is a covered employer within the meaning of Title VII; and
14. Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983). See Bartels v. Birmingham,
332 U.S. 126 (1943).
15. Bartels, 332 U.S. at 129; Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1340.
16. Doe on behalf of Doe v. Saint Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1986); Sibley
Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Puntolillo v. New Hamp-
shire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974).
17. See, e.g., Saint Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d at 424; Sibley Memorial Hosp., 488 F.2d
at 1341; Puntolillo, 375 F. Supp. at 1092 (citing Sibley, 488 F.2d at 1341).
18. See, e.g., Saint Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d at 422; Sibley Memorial Hosp., 488 F.2d
at 1342; Puntolillo, 375 F. Supp. at 1092 (citing Sibley, at 1342).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1981).
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(2) the claimant must demonstrate the existence of an identifiable em-
ployment relationship which is allegedly being interfered with by the
defendant.
II. The Framework of Title VII
A. Statutory Language
Section 2000e-2 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohib-
its employers from discriminating against any individual with respect
to terms of his or her employment on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin. The section provides that it shall be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to de-
prive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.20
An employer must employ at least fifteen employees in order to be
subject to the Act.2" These provisions have caused confusion among
the courts because of the statute's circular definitions of "employee"
and "employer." For Title VII purposes, an "employee" is defined as
an "individual employed by an employer."22 An "employer" is "a
20. Id.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1964), amended by Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(2) (March 24,
1972). Originally, the Act only applied to employers who employed twenty-five or more
employees. This was amended in 1972 to extend coverage. Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 2(2)(March 24, 1972). Many state civil rights statutes have lower jurisdictional requirements
than Title VII. For example, Colorado and Wyoming both prohibit discrimination by
employers with two or more employees. See Newcom, Hishon v. King & Spalding: Dis-
crimination in Professional Partnerships, 62 DEN. U.L. REV. 485, 492 (1985).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)(1964), amended by Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(2) (March 24,
1972) defines employee as:
an individual employed by an employer, except that the term "employee" shall
not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivi-
sion of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such
officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policy mak-
ing level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitu-
tional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding
sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State
government, governmental agency or political subdivision.
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person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or
more employees." 23 The term "employee" has been used for two pur-
poses: (1) for determining who is an employer,24 and (2) for determin-
ing unlawful employment practices.25 Most of the provisions defining
unlawful employment practices, however, use the term "any individ-
ual" rather than "employee." ' 26 The statute, however, fails to define
the specific factors which create an employment relationship. This
shortcoming2" has required the courts to adopt several tests for deter-
mining who is an employee for the purposes of bringing a Title VII
action.29
B. The History of Title VII in Relation to Other Federal Statutes
Title VII proscribes specific discriminatory practices by employers
engaging in industries affecting commerce.30 In general, an employer
engages in discriminatory practices by making certain distinctions in
the treatment of employees.3' Under the Act, discrimination is pro-
hibited only if it is based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) provides:
(b) The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in
each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calen-
dar year, and any agent of such a person, but such term does not include
(1) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of
the United States, an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the
District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive
service (as defined in section 2102 of Title 5 of the United States Code), or
(2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organization)
which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of Title 26 of the
United States Code, except that during the first year after March 24, 1972,
persons having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall
not be considered employers.
24. Id.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
27. See, e.g., Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 339 (1 1th Cir.) ("There is no
further elaboration in the statute, nor is there any evidence in the legislative history as to
how expansively that definition [of employee] is meant to be read."), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 874 (1982); Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985) (Title VII statute is
of "scant help" in defining "employee"); Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 830 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) ("[w]hether appellant is an employee... is more difficult to determine, because
the Act does not clearly compel consideration of any particular set of factors."). See
Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 75 (1984); EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 1.2.
28. See supra note 27.
29. See infra notes 78-137 and accompanying text.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
31. 110 CONG. REc. 7218 (daily ed. April 8, 1964).
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Those covered under Title VII are delineated by the definitions of
"employer" and "employee." 3 Although these terms are defined in
the manner common for other relevant federal statutes, 34 the defini-
tions of "employer" and "employee" in the federal statutes were, until
amended, also unclear.35
The legislative history of Title VII reveals little as to the reach of
the Act. 36 Legislative history does indicate, however, that the exclu-
sion of public officials and their personal staff members from the pro-
vision defining "employee" is to be narrowly construed.37  For
example, the conference report on this legislation states "[ilt is the
conferees [sic] intent that this exemption shall be narrowly
construed."s3
Judicial interpretation of the terms in federal social legislation 39 has
implemented the congressional intent to encourage liberal defini-
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), (f).
34. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS (78 Stat.) 2391, 2402. See 110 CONG. REC. 7216 (daily ed. April 8,
1964) (statement of Sen. Clark) (During the Senate debates on Title VII, Sen. Joseph
Clark stated that "the term 'employer' is intended to have its common dictionary mean-
ing except as expressly qualified by the act.").
Black's Law Dictionary defines "employer" as: "one who employs the services of
others; one for whom employees work and who pays their wages or salaries." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 471 (5th ed. 1979).
Black's defines "employee" as: "a person in the service of another under any contract
of hire, express or implied, oral or written, where the employer has the power or right to
control and direct the employee in material details of how the work is to be performed."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 471 (5th ed. 1979).
But see EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 35-36 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing how an
individual could not be considered an employee under some common law standards and
some federal definitions, while nevertheless could be considered an employee under
others).
35. The Fair Labor Standards Act, National Labor Relations Act, Social Security
Act and Title VII have nearly identical provisions defining "employer" and "employee."
See 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1978); 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1972); 42 U.S.C. § 410 (1982). See also
Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1986); In re
National Airlines Inc., 700 F.2d 695 (1 th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983).
36. Lavender-Cabellero v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 458 F. Supp. 213, 214
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (This court has not been able to find "any explicit language, in either the
statute or the legislative history, to illuminate this issue.").
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); see also Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981).
38. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, reprinted in
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (86 Stat.) 2137, 2180.
39. Social legislation includes but is not limited to the National Labor Relations Act,
The Fair Labor Standards Act and the Social Security Act.
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tions. ° The Supreme Court4" has examined the definition of employee
in the context of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),42 the
Social Security Act (SSA) 43 and the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).44 The Court, however, has considered the definition of em-
ployee under Title VII only in the context of partnership decisions.45
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. ,46 the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether newsboys were "employees" under the NLRA. The case
arose when Hearst Publications (Hearst) refused to comply with an
NLRA bargaining order. Hearst argued that the newsboys were indi-
vidual contractors and therefore, not covered by the NLRA. Since
Congress had not explicitly defined the term "employee," its meaning
had to be determined by reference to common law standards.47
Hearst invoked the common law test that looks at principles of
agency to determine the power of control (whether or not exercised)
that an employer has over the manner in which a service is to be
performed. The Court, however, rejected the narrow common law
right to control test as the appropriate standard for employee status
under the NLRA,4 s instead holding that the history, context and pur-
pose of the NLRA and the economic facts of the relation must also be
40. See 110 CONG. REC. 13,087-93 (daily ed. June 9, 1964) (statements of Senators
Morse, Humphrey and others). Sen. Humphrey commented:
[i]t should be remembered that 25 States have fair employment laws. The laws
of 23 of these States have more liberal coverage than the pending bill. Thus in
States such as Connecticut, Delaware and Wisconsin, there is no minimum
number of employees that are required for an employer to be covered ....
Other Federal statutes also provide precedent for our consideration of the cov-
erage of Title VII. In the past, when Congress has enacted legislation to deal
with significant community problems, the goal always has been to make cover-
age as broad as possible .... The need for fair employment legislation is imper-
ative. Its scope should be broad and encompassing.
Id. at 13,090-91. See also Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984).
41. See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947); Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.,
330 U.S. 148 (1947); NLRB v. Hearst Publications Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1973).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1982).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1978). See infra notes 60 and 96 and accompanying text.
45. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). The Hishon Court ruled that in
certain circumstances, the decision of a law firm to make an associate a partner is subject
to Title VII's antidiscrimination provision. The Court reasoned that partnership consid-
eration is a term, privilege, or condition of an associate's employment. Id. at 76. Justice
Powell, in his concurring opinion, emphasized that the Court's decision did not constitute
a ruling that a partnership relationship is one of employment. Id. at 79.
46. 322 U.S. 111 (1944). Hearst has since been superceded by statute and overruled
by NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1967). See infra note 61.
47. Id. at 120. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
48. Id. at 129.
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considered.49 Upon applying these factors, the Court held that the
newsboys were employees, thereby reversing the Ninth Circuit.
The Supreme Court has since applied the Hearst analysis in several
cases regarding the definition of employee in the context of other so-
cial legislation. 50 In United States v. Silk,5 the plaintiff sued for recov-
ery of social security taxes it had paid on the basis that the workers
unloading and delivering his coal were independent contractors. The
Court examined the legislative history of the SSA to search for the
definition of "employee" under the SSA and decided that
"[a]pplication of the social security legislation should follow the same
rule that [was] applied to the [NLRA] in the Hearst case." 52 Despite
this willingness, the Court ultimately focused upon the common law
factors bypassed in Hearst,53 such as the permanency of the relation-
ship, the skills required, the risk undertaken and the control exer-
cised. The Court held that the workers were independent contractors
because they had their own trucks, hired their own helpers, could
haul for others and could be paid per trip.54 No one factor, however,
was controlling nor was the list complete. 55 Rather, the total situation
had to be examined.56 Shortly after Silk, the Court decided Bartels v.
Birmingham,57 in which the plaintiff, a ballroom owner, sued for so-
cial security taxes paid. The plaintiff claimed that the band members
were not his employees but employees of the band leader whom he
characterized as an independent contractor. The Court reasoned that
in determining employee status for the purposes of social legislation,
the common law right to control test was too narrow.5" The Court
stated that although the right to control is an element of the employ-
ment relationship, employees are "those who as a matter of economic
reality are dependent upon the business to which they render ser-
49. When the economic facts of the relation make it more nearly one of employment
rather than of independent business enterprise with respect to the ends sought to be ac-
complished by the legislation, those characteristics may outweigh the technical legal clas-
sification for purposes unrelated to the statute's objectives and bring the relation within
its protection. Id. at 128.
50. Such analysis has been applied to the SSA, the FLSA and by some courts to Title
VII. See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
51. 331 U.S. 704 (1947). Silk has since been superceded by statute. See infra note 62.
52. Id. at 713-14.
53. Id. at 712-15, 714 n.8. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
54. Id. at 719.
55. Id. at 716.
56. Id. at 719.
57. 332 U.S. 126 (1947). Bartels has since been superceded by statute. See infra note
62.
58. Id. at 130.
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vice."5 9 The Court enunciated the factors that made up the "total
situation": the band leader organized and trained the band and se-
lected the members; it was the band leader's skill and showmanship
that determined the success or failure of the organization; and the
relations between him and the other members were permanent while
those between the band and the operator were transient.6°
Congress responded to these constructions of the term "employee"
by amending those statutes it thought should have a more restrictive
definition. For example, Congress amended the NLRA to exclude in-
dependent contractors 61 and the SSA to require the use of the com-
mon law test to determine employee status,62 but did not amend the
59. Id. In applying this test, the courts generally focus on five factors: (1) the degree
of control exerted by the alleged employer over the worker; (2) the worker's opportunity
for profit or loss; (3) the worker's investment in the business; (4) the permanence of the
working relationship; and (5) the degree of skill required to perform the work. See Trust-
ees of Sabine Area Carpenters' Health & Welfare Fund v. Don Lightfoot Home Builder,
Inc., 704 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 1983). This standard has also been used in cases involv-
ing the FLSA. See also Mednick v. Albert Enterprises Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir.
1975) (in federal social welfare, the term employee should not be restricted to common
law meaning).
60. Bartels, 332 U.S. at 132. The Hearst analysis was also persuasive in defining the
coverage under the FLSA. See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150
(1947); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 723, 730 (1947) (Decisions
defining the coverage of the employer-employee relationship under the NLRA and the
SSA are persuasive in the consideration of a similar condition under the FLSA. The
Court further stated that determination does not depend on isolated factors but rather
upon the circumstances of the whole activity.). See also Mednick v. Albert Enterprises,
Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1975) (The FLSA definition was articulated. The court
held that in federal social welfare, the term "employee" should not be restricted to com-
mon law meaning. Thus, a person is an "employee" under the FLSA if he or she is
economically dependent on the business.).
61. The amendment was designed to codify the common law distinction between in-
dependent contractors and employees. As the statute reads today:
the term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a conse-
quence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substan-
tially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as
an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his
home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual
having the status of an independent contractor ....
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). See Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, H.R. REP. No.
245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LA-
BOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT at 309 (criticizing the Hearst Court for expanding
the meaning of "employee" and ignoring common law distinctions between independent
contractor and employee); NLRB v. Amber Delivery Serv., Inc., 651 F.2d 57 (1st Cir.
1981). See generally Note, Section 2(3) of the NLRA and the "Right to Control" Test, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 768 (1982).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 4100)(2). The Social Security Act defines "employee" as "any
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FLSA.63
Congress used the NLRA as the model for Title VII's remedial
provisions. 4 Therefore, had Congress wanted a limitation on the term
"employee" in Title VII, it would have been explicit in the statute.65
Furthermore, Title VII expressly includes within its reach employ-
ment agencies66 and labor organizations67 as well as employers. In
addition, when Congress amended Title VII to include the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972,68 the amendment to Section
701(f) expanded Title VII's coverage to include employees who had
previously been excluded, those individuals employed by state and
federal governments. The amendment to Section 701(b) reduced the
minimum number of employees from twenty-five to fifteen thereby
serving to broaden its reach by subjecting more employers to the
Act.69 These actions indicate that Congress intended that the Act
have a broad reach.7 °
individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the em-
ployer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee .... " Id. See also Demo-
cratic Union Org. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862 (1979).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). The FLSA provides in part: "Ce]xcept as provided in
paragraphs (2) and (3), the term 'employee' means any individual employed by an em-
ployer." See Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1514 (1st Cir. 1983) (Congress' silence
in not amending the FLSA definitions in wake of judicial construction indicates an acqui-
escence to the broad judicial interpretation of such definitions).
64. E.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 395 n.11 (1982); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 366 (1977); Armbruster v.
Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336, 1341 (6th Cir. 1983).
65. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.
1986) (because the FLSA, Title VII and the ADEA have nearly identical provisions de-
fining "employer" and "employee" and have similar purposes, cases construing the defi-
nitional provisions of the one are persuasive authorities when interpreting the others); see
also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 395 n.1l (1982); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 366 (1977); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711
F.2d 1332, 1336, 1341 (6th Cir. 1983).. There is the contrary view that had Congress
wanted a broader definition, it would not have enacted such a limited amendment.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c) provides: "[t]he term 'employment agency' means any per-
son regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an
employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer and includes
an agent of such a person."
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(d) defines a labor organization as: "a labor organization en-
gaged in an industry affecting commerce... ." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e) for what consti-
tutes a "labor organization in an industry affecting commerce."
68. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)).
69. See Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336-37 (6th Cir. 1983).
70. Id. at 1341. No court has made the argument that had Congress wanted to
broaden the reach of Title VII, it would not have limited the 1972 amendment to only
decreasing the number of employees needed to make an employer come within the Act
and including public employees.
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III. Tests to Determine Who has Standing to Sue
Under Title VII
A. General Standing Requirements
Whether a plaintiff can bring a Title VII claim depends on whether
that individual is a "person aggrieved." Such a person must meet the
standing requirements of the statute. This includes complying with
the procedural requirements of the Act: filing a timely charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and filing an action
promptly after receiving a notice of right to sue.7'
In addition, the plaintiff must satisfy two other requirements. The
standing rules under Article III of the United States Constitution re-
quire that a plaintiff show "an injury to him or herself that is likely to
be redressed by a favorable decision. "72 This constitutional require-
ment is one of "injury in fact," meaning that as a result of defendant's
action, the plaintiff suffered a "distinct and palpable injury." 73 The
plaintiff must also demonstrate that his or her interest is "arguably
withinrthe zone of interests to be protected or regulated" by the statu-
tory framework.74
A cognizible claim under Title VII requires that the plaintiff allege
and prove some link between the defendant's actions and an employ-
ment relationship. 7- How extensive that relationship must be, or with
whom, is not explicitly stated in the statute or its legislative history.
Under some courts' interpretation, a plaintiff has standing only if an
employer-employee relationship was contemplated by the parties.76
Other courts have concluded that the language of § 703(a) of the Act,
"or otherwise discriminate against any individual... ," encompasses
situations where a defendant subject to Title VII interferes with an
individual's employment opportunities with another employer.77
B. The Common Law Test of Power to Control
and the Hybrid Test
Courts originally distinguished between employees and non-em-
ployees by using the common law test of the degree of control the
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
72. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
73. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
74. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
75. Beverley v. Douglas, 591 F. Supp. 1321, 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
76. See infra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
77. Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980);
Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1340-41 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Gomez v.
Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1983).
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employer had over the means and manner of the worker's perform-
ance.78 An employer-employee relationship was likely to exist if an
employer had the right to control and direct the work of the individ-
ual.79 Furthermore, for employee status to attach, the employer had
to have not only the control over the result to be achieved, but also
over the details by which the result was to be achieved. If the power
to control is insignificant, the worker is more likely to be an independ-
ent contractor.
Some courts in construing Title VII still strictly follow the common
law principles of agency, 0 and therefore bar an individual from bring-
ing suit if that individual is an independent contractor. In light of the
Supreme Court's decisions regarding the definition of "employee" in
other social reform legislation," however, a majority of federal courts
have modified the common law test when determining employee sta-
tus under Title VII. 2 These courts apply a hybrid of the common law
right to control and the economic realities standards. In this "hybrid"
test, all circumstances surrounding the work relationship are. given
consideration to determine employee status.8 3 The most important
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958) provides in relevant part:
2. A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs
whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is
subject to the right to control by the master.
3. An independent contractor is a person who contracts to work with another
to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject
to the other's right to control with respect to his physical control in the
performance of the undertaking. He may or may not be an agent.
See Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985) (the first test used to determine
employer-employee status was the traditional common law test of agency); Case com-
ment, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Zippo Manufacturing Co.: Choice
of a Test for Coverage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 64 B.U.L. REV.
1145, 1155 (1984).
79. Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
80. See Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513, 516 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
("While the Court agrees with plaintiff that Title VII is not to be construed narrowly,
there is nothing in the legislative history of the Act to indicate a Congressional intent to
construe the term 'employee' in any manner other than in accordance with common-law
agency principles."), aff'd mem., 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1978).
81. In federal social welfare legislation, the terms "employee" and "independent con-
tractor" are not to be construed in the common law sense. See supra notes 41-60 and
accompanying text.
82. See Diggs v. Harris Hosp.-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
109 S.Ct. 394 (1988); Broussard v. L.H. Bossier Inc., 789 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1986);
Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1985); Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337
(11 th Cir.) (the court applied the common law right to control test and although it did
look at other factors, those factors were identical to those listed in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982); Spirides v. Reinhardt,
613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
83. Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337 (1 lth Cir. 1982). "[I]t is the economic
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factor, however, still remains to be the employer's right to control.84
The District of Columbia Circuit, in Spirides v. Reinhardt,5 identi-
fied the other factors which the "hybrid" test proponents consider: 6
(1) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether the work
usually is done under the direction of a supervisor or is done by a
specialist without supervision; (2) the skill required in the particu-
lar occupation; (3) whether the "employer" or the individual in
question furnishes the equipment used and the place of work; (4)
the length of time during which the individual has worked; (5) the
method of payment, whether by time or by the job; (6) the manner
in which the work relationship is terminated; i.e., by one or both
parties, with or without notice and explanation; (7) whether annual
leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the
business of the "employer"; (9) whether the worker accumulates
retirement benefits; (10) whether the "employer" pays social secur-
ity taxes; and (11) the intention of the parties.8 7
The Spirides plaintiff, a former foreign language broadcaster for a di-
vision of Voice of America, brought an employment discrimination
action after the defendant refused to renew her contract. The plaintiff
had worked pursuant to purchase order vendor contracts that stipu-
lated she "shall perform such services as an independent contractor
.... ,,s The court noted that under Title VII, contractual provisions'
agreed upon by the parties in a contract are not binding for purposes
of defining whether plaintiff is an "employee"; 9 the intent of the par-
ties is merely a factor to be considered.' ° The court of appeals re-
manded so that the district court could review all the circumstances
surrounding plaintiff's work relationship rather than just the elements
of her contract with the defendant.9" The factors set out in Spirides,
however, are very similar to those listed in the Restatement (Second)
of Agency for distinguishing between employee and independent con-
realities of the relationship viewed in light of the common law principles of agency and
the right of the employer to control the employee that are determinative." Id. at 341.
84. Hickey v. Arkla Indus. Inc., 699 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1983); Spirides v. Rein-
hardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See Helenkamp v. Kingsley Assoc., 682 F.
Supp. 813 (W.D. Pa. 1987); Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.,
611 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1985).
85. 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
86. See id. at 832.
87. Id.
88. 486 F. Supp. 685, 687 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd without opinion, 656 F.2d 900 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
89. Id. (citing Mueller v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 339 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1965)).
90. See id.
91. 613 F.2d at 833. Using the factors enunciated by the District of Columbia Circuit,
the district court held that the plaintiff was not an employee.
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tractor.92 The Restatement provides:
[i]n determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an
independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among
others are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master
may exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the in-
strumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person
doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the
job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of
the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
relation of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in the business.93
The "hybrid" test is formally different from the common law rules for
distinguishing between servant and independent contractor. In the Ti-
tle VII context, however, the applications and results of both tests are
essentially the same.
94
C. The Economic Realities Test
The Sixth Circuit has rejected the common law and "hybrid"
tests.95 Instead, the Circuit has adopted an "economic realities" test,
derived from the FLSA. 96
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
93. Id.
94. Mitchell v. Tenney, 650 F. Supp. 703, 705-706 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
95. Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983).
96. This test was first used by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Hearst Publications,
Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 128-29, reh'g denied, 322 U.S. 769 (1944). See Mednick v. Albert
Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1975). Mednick operated cardrooms for defend-
ant's apartment house-hotel. The defendant did not pay plaintiff for vacation or sick
leave. The plaintiff received no benefits and paid his own social security and withholding
taxes. In addition, Mednick hired and fired the people who worked in the cardrooms.
Plaintiff had no written contract with the defendant but did wear a uniform bearing de-
fendant's name. The court found Mednick to be an employee for the purposes of the
FLSA because he was, as a matter of economic reality, dependent upon the defendant's
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In Armbruster v. Quinn,97 the court considered whether manufac-
turer's representatives were employees within the jurisdictional provi-
sions of Title VII. 98 These employees worked outside of the corporate
office, could sell other products and could set their own hours. The
court stated that "one must examine the economic realities underlying
the relationship between the individual and the so-called principal in
an effort to determine whether that individual is likely to be suscepti-
ble to the discriminatory practices which the act was designed to elim-
inate." 99 That is, courts should examine whether the employer is in
the position to affect the ongoing working conditions of that em-
ployee. The Armbruster court considered the legislative history and
determined that Congress intended to cover all workers who may be
subject to these discriminatory practices, °° unless such workers are
excluded by specific statutory exception.10' The court held that the
term "employee" in Title VII
"must be read in light of the mischief to be corrected and the end
to be attained." The mischief to be corrected is that discrimination
in employment opportunity has been made unlawful by Title VII's
violation provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 and 3: the end, to rid
from the world of work the evil of discrimination because of an
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.1 2
Furthermore, the Armbruster court noted that Title VII was
modeled in important aspects after the NLRA and that Congress had
amended the NLRA to exclude all independent contractors prior to
formulating Title VII. Therefore, if Congress had wanted to limit the
business as his means of livelihood. Quoting Fahs v. Tree-Gold Co-op. Growers of Flor-
ida, Inc., 166 F.2d 40, 44 (5th Cir. 1948), the court stated:
[t]he ultimate criteria are to be found in the purposes of the act. Under these
decisions [Silk, Rutherford, Bartels and Hearst], the act is intended to protect
those whose livelihood is dependent upon finding employment in the business of
others. It is directed towards those who themselves are least able in good times
to make provisions for their needs when old age and unemployment may cut off
their earnings. The statutory coverage is not limited to those [whose work activ-
ities satisfy the common law "control" test] but rather to those who, as a matter
of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they render
service.
Id. at 300.
97. 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983).
98. Id. at 1339.
99. Id. at 1340.
100. Id. at 1339.
101. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (persons not covered as employees); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (entities not considered employers); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(e)-(j) (special
exceptions).
102. 711 F.2d at 1340 (quoting Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 145 (6th
Cir. 1977)).
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scope of "employee," it would have explicitly incorporated a provi-
sion in the statute. 0 3 Absent such explicit limitation, the Armbruster
court "refuse[d] to imply such a restriction into the otherwise broad
terms of the Act.''04 The court suggested several factors to examine
when determining whether the workers are susceptible to the kind of
unlawful practices that Title VII was intended to remedy: 105 hiring
and termination processes, history of the positions, evidence of pay-
ment, and advancement opportunities. 106
One Michigan court has further developed Armbruster's economic
realities test by holding that a court has an obligation to look beyond
the title of a claimant's position to determine his or her standing for
Title VII. In Ross v. William Beaumont Hospital,17 the court decided
that a physician was a Title VII employee of a hospital which termi-
nated his staff privileges. In so deciding, the Ross court analogized to
the Supreme Court's decision in Hishon v. King & Spalding 08 that the
right of an associate to be considered for partnership is a term, condi-
tion, or privilege of employment since it was an expectation created
by the working or contractual relationship." Moreover, the Ross
court relied on a Pennsylvania case which applied the Hishon analysis
to a medical resident's right to be considered for staff privileges at the
hospital of residency." 0 Through these cases, the Ross court deter-
mined that Dr. Ross had a contractual privilege or had been granted a
benefit to use the hospital's facilities for surgery."' The court then
applied the "economic realities test" of Armbruster but also stated
that issues which address an employee's ability to obtain comparable
employment and the nature of the disciplinary mechanism are addi-
103. 711 F.2d at 1341.
104. Id. at 1341. But see Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
105. Id. at 1342.
106. Id. at 1342 n.9.
107. 678 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
108. 467 U.S. 69 (1983).
109. 678 F. Supp. at 675.
110. See Amro v. St. Luke's Hosp., 39 F.E.P. 1574 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
111. 678 F. Supp. at 675. In Brewster v. Shockley, 554 F. Supp. 365, 371 (W.D. Va.
1983), the court determined that a deputy sheriff was an "employee" under the Act by
considering evidence relevant to the following factors:
(1) whether the relationship between a sheriff and deputy sheriff was an official
relationship or a private one; (2) whether the deputy sheriff had an employment
contract with the sheriff; (3) whether a quasi-contractual relationship existed
such that a deputy had a "reasonable expectation" of continuing a specific job
assignment or of obtaining promotions or raises in any established manner; and
(4) whether a seniority system was in effect for deputies by which assignment to
a particular job, promotions or pay raises were granted.
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tional factors that should be explored.' 1
The economic realities test provides a framework for analysis that
insures broad protection of workers from potential employment dis-
crimination by focusing on the economic terms of a particular rela-
tionship. It has been followed, however, only by courts within the
Sixth Circuit.
D. Interference with Employment Opportunities Test
A minority of jurisdictions use a test which focuses on interference
with employment opportunities rather than on the claimant's actual
employment relationship with the defendant." 3 By focusing on the
substantive provisions of the statute that prohibit an employer from
discriminating against "any individual" (not necessarily an em-
ployee), "4 this test allows more coverage than those that insist on an
immediate employment relationship between the plaintiff and defend-
ant. In Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson," 5 the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court ruled that the term, "any individual," in
§ 703(a)(1)"16 reaches beyond the immediate employment relation-
ship." 7 In Sibley, a male private duty nurse alleged that the hospital
discriminated against him on the basis of sex because it refused to
refer him to female patients. The hospital argued that because neither
party contemplated a direct employment relationship between them,
112. 678 F. Supp. at 675. "Ross clearly satisfies Title VII under this standard. She
based her whole livelihood at Beaumont, including service as chairperson of some of
Beaumont's committees, underwent extensive progressive discipline, including probation
and leaves of absence." Id.
113. See Doe on behalf of Doe v. Saint Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 422 (7th Cir.
1986); Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Gomez
v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1983) (Plaintiff alleged that the
defendant violated Title VII by failing to hire plaintiff's corporation due to the national
origin of the corporation's employees. Defendant's motion for summary judgement on
the grounds that plaintiff lacked standing because he was not defendant's employee was
denied. The court stated that because defendant's actions deprived plaintiff of an opportu-
nity to be employed as director of defendant's emergency room, plaintiff had standing to
sue under Title VII); Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484, 494 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (Plaintiff, a physician was denied staff privileges. The court said that the Hospital
shared an employment relationship with the plaintiff because it controlled his access to
"prospective patients who are his ultimate 'employers.'" (footnote omitted)). But see
Mitchell v. Frank R. Howard Memorial Hosp., 853 F.2d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 1988) (where
the court rejected plaintiff's argument that the hospital violated Title VII by interfering
with his employment relationship with his patients. The court found that the traditional
physician/patient relationship was not one of employee/employer and as such was not
protected under Title VII), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1123 (1989).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
115. 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
117. 488 F.2d at 1341.
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the hospital could not be the nurse's employer. The court rejected the
hospital's argument, stating that the Act contains no words of limita-
tion that restrict "any individual" to an employee of an employer."'
Although the term "individual" may have been intended to encom-
pass applicants as well as employees, 19 it does not necessarily require
that the employment held or sought be with the defendant. The court
in Sibley noted:
the Act defines "employee" as an "individual employed by an em-
ployer," but nowhere are there words of limitation that restrict ref-
erences in the Act to "any individual" as comprehending only an
employee of an employer. Nor is there any good reason to confine
the meaning of "any individual" to include only former employees
and applicants for employment, in addition to present employees.
Those words should, therefore, be given their ordinary meaning so
long as that meaning does not conflict with the manifest policy of
the Act. ' 20
Furthermore, the Act, in providing for the filing of charges with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,' 2' uses the term "per-
son claiming to be aggrieved" rather than "employee."' ' 22
Although the court did not define the relationship necessary to
maintain a Title VII action, it suggested that the nurse stood in some
type of employment relationship with the patient.' 23 The nurse could
118. Id.
119. Wilson v. Monosanto Co., 315 F. Supp. 977, 978 (E.D. La. 1970) (Title VII ap-
plies to applicants).
120. Sibley, 488 F.2d at 1341. See Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375
F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974). The plaintiff, a driver/trainer of horses alleged national
origin discrimination against the defendant for denying him a license and stall space nec-
essary for him to gain employment with harness horse owners. The court said:
[t]hroughout the Act and the applicable federal regulations, an intent to deal
with more than the conventional employer-employee situation is indicated. This
intent is demonstrated by the specific prohibition against discrimination by em-
ployment agencies and labor organizations, and by the prohibition of discrimi-
nation against individuals (as opposed to employees who are defined as
"individual[s] employed by an employer.").
Id. at 1091.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
122. Id. See Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 445 (3d Cir. 1971) ("A
person claiming to be aggrieved may never have been an employee of the defendant ....
An aggrieved person obviously is any person aggrieved by any of the forbidden
practices.").
123. Sibley, 488 F.2d at 1342. But see Beverley v. Douglas, 591 F. Supp. 1321
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (a Black female physician was held to be an independent contractor with
respect to her patients and to have no employment relationship with the defendant hospi-
tal. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the doctor's
claim because no employment relationship had been interfered with by the denial of vol-
untary admitting privileges and corresponding faculty appointment.).
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be considered an applicant for a job, thereby constituting a type of
relationship covered by Title VII. Although the hospital was not the
plaintiff's employer, the hospital was "so circumstanced, and its daily
operations [were] of such a character as to have ... a nexus to the
third parties in this case .... [N]either the spirit nor, more essen-
tially, the language of the Act leave [sic] it outside the reach of Title
VII."' 2 4 The court also pointed out that:
[t]o permit a covered employer to exploit circumstances peculiarly
affording it the capability of discriminatorily interfering with an
individual's employment opportunities with another employer,
while it could not do so with respect to employment in its own
service, would be to condone continued use of the very criteria for
employment that Congress has prohibited.'
25
The Seventh Circuit furthered the idea established in Sibley in its
1986 decision of Doe on behalf of Doe v. Saint Joseph's Hospital. 26 In
Saint Joseph's Hospital, a physician brought an action, following the
loss of staff privileges, against the hospital, its corporate owner, its
board of directors, its administrator, the president of its medical staff
and the members of its medical staff executive committee. 127 The dis-
trict court held that one must be an "employee" to state a Title VII
claim for employment discrimination, and because no employment re-
lationship existed between the physician and the hospital, the claim
was dismissed. 28 The Seventh Circuit, in reversing, held that the
plaintiff had a cognizable claim under Title VII even though she was
admittedly not an employee of the hospital. 29 Although employee
status is important, the court stated that the focus must be on whether
the defendant can subject the plaintiff to the type of acts 3 ° which
124. Id. at 1342.
125. Sibley, 488 F.2d at 1341.
126. 788 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1986). Previously, the Seventh Circuit followed either the
"hybrid" test or the Armbruster rationale on a case by case basis. See Unger v. Consoli-
dated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 456 U.S. 1002 (1982) (court relied on factors set out in Spirides in determining
that plaintiff was an employee), cert. denied 464 U.S. '1017 (1983). But see EEOC v.
Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 34 F.E.P. Cases 1815, 1816 (7th Cir. 1984) (the court applied the
Armbruster rationale in determining whether shareholders in a law firm could be consid-
ered employees).
127. 788 F.2d at 413.
128. Id. at 422.
129. Id. Plaintiff had been denied staff privileges and alleged discrimination on the
basis of race.
130. The Supreme Court compared Title VII with 28 U.S.C. § 1981 in Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). The Court found that certain acts are
post-formation conduct by the employer and, because they relate to terms and conditions
of continuing employment, they are "actionable only under the more expansive reach of
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Title VII prohibits. 3 1 Relying on Sibley, 132 the court noted that de-
fendant's alleged discriminatory conduct deprived the plaintiff of ac-
cess to those prospective patients who ultimately would be her
"employers."'' 33
Since Saint Joseph's Hospital, the Seventh Circuit has continued to
hold that the common law distinction between servant and independ-
ent contractor does not control the question of who may bring a Title
VII action. '34 The focus is not on whether the plaintiff is an employee
but on whether he or she was "an individual" denied equal access to
an employment opportunity 35 whether or not that opportunity was
with the defendant.
IV. Analysis
Current definitions in social legislation statutes reflect an intent to
either incorporate common law standards or to provide flexibility for
administrative agencies and courts in interpreting the concept of "em-
ployee" in light of workplace realities and the policies of the statutes.
The definitional provisions of Title VII, however, are silent as to con-
gressional intent and this has resulted in the courts adopting a variety
of tests to determine employee status. These tests often result in differ-
ent outcomes. Therefore, it is imperative that a consistent method be
used. Ideally the way to achieve such consistency would be for Con-
Title VII." Id. at 2369. Acts violative of Title VII include racial harassment such as
giving a Black more work than a white employee, assigning her more demeaning tasks
than those given to white employees, subjecting her to a racial slur, singling her out for
criticism and not affording her the training for higher level jobs which white employees
received. Id. at 2367. "[H]arrassment [which is] sufficiently severe or pervasive to 'alter
the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment,'
• ..is actionable under Title VII because it 'affects a term, condition or privilege' of
employment." Id. at 2374 (quoting Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67
(1986)).
131. Saint Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d at 422-23.
132. The court also relied on Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Pa.
1982). The plaintiff in Pao alleged Title VII discrimination after being denied staff privi-
leges at defendant hospital. In addressing the defendant's argument that plaintiff lacked
standing, the court stated that "[w]hether or not the plaintiff had access to, or could gain
access to, other hospital facilities is not relevant to the principal question whether his
Title VII rights have been violated .... [Tihe focal question is whether the defendants
can be considered employers whose allegedly invidious conduct deprived the plaintiff of
an employment opportunity within the meaning of the Act." Id. at 494.
133. 788 F.2d at 424-25 (quoting Pao, 547 F. Supp. at 491). A discriminatory denial of
staff privileges adversely affects a physician's ability to obtain and maintain employment
by patients who need hospitalization. See id. at 427.
134. See Mitchell v. Tenney, 650 F. Supp. 703, 707-08 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Ellerby v. State
of Illinois, 46 F.E.P. Cases 524, 525 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
135. Ellerby v. State of Illinois, 46 F.E.P. Cases at 526 (citing Saint Joseph's Hosp., 788
F.2d at 421-25).
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gress to either amend the definition of "employee" under the Act as it
has done in the past with other social legislation statutes or to define
what constitutes "employed." ' 6
The problem with the common law standard and the "hybrid" ap-
proaches is that their narrow foci in defining "employer" and "em-
ployee" 137 do not provide for the extensive coverage envisioned by
Congress.1 38 The narrowness results from their failure to consider the
term "employee" in the context of the overall statutory scheme.
139
Moreover, the narrow construction is inconsistent with the broad
reach of the statute's prohibitions and remedies as well as the steady
expansion of its coverage to more employees."4 The courts that have
adopted the common law test have ignored the legislative history of
federal social legislation. 41 Their reluctance142 to adopt a broader
test reflects an unwillingness to consider the policies underlying Title
VII.143
In Armbruster, the Sixth Circuit rejected the "hybrid" test and fo-
cused on the economic realities that permit employment discrimina-
tion to occur. The issue under this test is the control of employment
136. The reason Congress should amend the statute is because "[c]ourts are generally
less competent than employers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated to
do so by Congress they should not attempt it." Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 578 (1978).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
138. See notes 5 and 36-38 and accompanying text.
139. "The right to be free from all forms of racial intolerance is so fundamentally the
privilege of each and every citizen of the United States.... ." 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2430 (statement of Sen. Moore).
140. The 1972 amendments were meant to expand coverage. EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563
F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 915 (1978). See notes 69-70 and accompa-
nying text. In addition, exclusive reliance on control makes it too difficult for a plaintiff to
establish standing, a result inconsistent with the statute's remedial nature. Saint Joseph's
Hosp., 788 F.2d at 425 n.28.
141. See Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983). But see Cobb v.
Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337. (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982); Smith v.
Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513, 516 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd mem., 580 F.2d 1054
(9th Cir. 1978) ("[T]here is nothing in the legislative history of the Act to indicate Con-
gressional intent to construe the term 'employee' in any manner other than in accordance
with common-law agency principles.").
142. The courts' reluctance stems from the fact that "there is no statement in the Act
or legislative history of Title VII comparable to one made by Senator Hugo Black (later
Justice Black), during the debates on the Fair Labor Standards Act, that the term 'em-
ployee' in the FLSA was given the broadest definition that has ever been included in any
one act." Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
874 (1982). See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
143. Furthermore, there is no apparent reason to allow discrimination against in-
dependent contractors on the basis of the proscribed criteria. Such narrow construction
could lead to inducing employers to hire independent contractors rather than employees
so as to avoid the impact of Title VII.
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opportunities, viewed from the perspective of the employee's depen-
dency on the employer, rather than the employer's right to control the
means and manner of the employee's performance. 1" The Armbruster
court stated:
[t]his principle not only applies to the coverage of the antidis-
crimination provision of Title VII imposing liability on an em-
ployer and protection for the employee, but it necessarily must
apply for the jurisdictional scope of the Act. To conclude that one
is an employee for the purposes of the antidiscrimination provision
and yet to find that he/she is not to be considered as an employee
for the purpose of meeting the fifteen employee jurisdictional re-
quirement would frustrate the very purpose of the Act. 145
Thus, Armbruster holds that the same individual who holds employee
status for the purposes of the antidiscrimination provision should also
be considered an employee for jurisdictional purposes. To hold other-
wise would frustrate the intent of the Act.
This economic realities method, while avoiding the rigidity of the
common law test, nevertheless has its problems. It ignores the differ-
ent terminology of the provisions of the statute. 146 The jurisdictional
provision 4 7 speaks of employees, whereas the antidiscrimination pro-
vision 1 48 speaks in terms of "any individual."' 9 Therefore, some indi-
viduals can be protected under the antidiscrimination provision even
though they cannot be counted for jurisdictional purposes. 50 For ex-
ample, a part-time worker who does not work a sufficient number of
hours or weeks to meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) can
still bring suit against his or her employer as long as the employer has
enough employees to meet the jurisdictional requirements.'5 '
Both the "control" test and the "economic realities" test were re-
144. Dowd, The Test Of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 75, 112 (1984).
145. 711 F.2d at 1340.
146. Graves v. Women's Professional Rodeo Ass'n, 708 F. Supp. 233, 237 (W.D. Ark.
1989).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e), (f)(1) and (f)(3).
150. Graves, 708 F. Supp. at 237. See Hornick v. Duryea, 507 F. Supp. 1091 (M.D. Pa.
1980). See also Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484, 492-93 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
151. See Hornick v. Duryea, 507 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (M.D. Pa. 1980). In Hornick,
school crossing guards were considered employees even though they worked only a few
hours each day and were paid only $40 per month since they were hired, controlled and
paid by the borough and because the employer also employed enough full time workers to
exceed the jurisdictional threshold. See also Thurber v. Jack Reilly's Inc., 717 F.2d 633
(1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984).
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jected in a bona fide general partner situation in Wheeler v.
Hurdman.'52 In this case the court held that the plaintiff, a general
partner in defendant's accounting firm, who alleged her dismissal was
because of her sex, was not an employee under the Act. After consid-
ering both the "control" tests and the "economic realities" test, the
court reasoned that such tests ignore or unacceptably diminish the
essential attributes of partnerships, and are incapable of rational ap-
plication. 3 3 The factors established in Spirides, such as whether the
employer furnishes the equipment used, the place of work, the length
of time during which the individual has worked and payment by time
or by the job,'54 are largely inapposite in the general partnership con-
text. Furthermore, every general partner is "dependent on the busi-
ness" and such inquiry is essential to the "economic realities"
analysis.' 5 There is no way to apply the "domination" standard un-
less every partnership is given the burden of proving "some sort of
parity of influence and day to day independence between and among
the partners, free of 'control' by the partnership as a whole."'156
In Saint Joseph's Hospital, the Seventh Circuit placed emphasis on
a plaintiff's exposure to harm in regard to his or her compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment caused by an em-
ployer's discriminatory practices. 57 The employer need not be the
plaintiff's employer in terms of agency law, as long as it is an em-
ployer under the statutory definition and its act had a discriminatory
effect on the plaintiff's employment.15
The Saint Joseph's Hospital court noted that "the 'common law in-
dependent contractor/employee test' is often not applied to antidis-
crimination legislation, because 'it is considered inconsistent with the
remedial purposes behind such legislation.' "'59
Under the common law test, a physician denied staff privileges
152. Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987)
(dismissed general partner of accounting firm brought a Title VII suit alleging sex
discrimination).
153. Id. at 276. The domination of partner may not consist of an absence of rights. The
status of partners is permanent while employee status is transient. The status of general
partner carries important economic reality, assumptions of risk of loss and liabilities of its
employees. An entirely different body of statutes and case law applies to partners and
partnerships conferring rights and imposing obligations upon them. Id. at 274-75.
154. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
156. Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 273.
157. Saint Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d at 425.
158. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
159. Saint Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d at 425 n.28 (quoting Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d
1066, 1067 n.l (5th Cir. 1985)).
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would not be able to state a cause of action under Title VII 160 because
the hospital does not have such total control over plaintiff's ability to
obtain patients. Staffing privileges only afford a physician an opportu-
nity to treat patients at that particular hospital. A physician may still
treat patients at an office or another health facility.' 6' In jurisdictions
following the Doe analysis, however, this physician has a cause of ac-
tion. The problem with the Saint Joseph s Hospital test, however, is
that although it expands the reach of Title VII, it does not enunciate
definable dimensions of a valid Title VII discrimination claim. Fur-
thermore, such test does not indicate the extent of interference needed
to violate Title VII.
Because of the above mentioned problems, Congress should define
"employed" or at least clarify "employee" in the Statute. Until such
amendment is made, however, a two-part analysis should be consid-
ered. First the claimant would demonstrate that the defendant is an
employer within the definitions provision of Title VII, 162 thereby con-
ferring subject matter jurisdiction on the court. 63 Second, once an
employer is covered by the Act, Title VII protection extends to any
aggrieved individual who can demonstrate the existence of an identifi-
able employment relationship with the defendant or another which
the defendant is in a position to affect.'" The relationship with the
defendant need not be a traditional one;1 6' Title VII's protection can
extend to one whose employment opportunities have been interfered
160. See Beverley'v. Douglas, 591 F. Supp. 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), where the court
concluded:
[e]ven assuming that plaintiff has alleged that the Hospital's denial of her appli-
cation for voluntary attending privileges interfered with her relationship to her
patients, her relationship to her patients is not one of employment. Indeed,
plaintiff admits that "there is no question that a 'physician, in his or her rela-
tionship with patients, is the classic independent contractor.'" In order to in-
voke Title VII, plaintiff must allege and prove some link between the
defendants' actions and an employment relationship. No such connection is
present here--by plaintiff's own admission, her relationship to her patients is
not that of employer and employee.
Id. at 1328. See also Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hosp., 42 F.E.P. Cases 197(D.N.J. 1986) (in applying the "hybrid" test, a physician with staff privileges was an
independent contractor, not an employee of the hospital.)
161. Saint Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d at 427 (Ripple, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
162. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
163. Graves, 708 F. Supp. at 235. If the defendant does not have the requisite number
of qualified employees as required under the Statute, Title VII is inapplicable.
164. "[T]here must be a relationship of some kind, actual or potential, with some em-
ployer since the discrimination forbidden relates to the field of employment." LARSON,
§ 5.21 at 2-9.
165. Graves, 708 F. Supp. at 235. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
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with by the defendant's discriminatory conduct. To assure that a rela-
tionship is substantial enough so as not to subject an employer to Title
VII liability over matters only tangentially related to a claimant's em-
ployment concerns, the following factors should be considered:
whether the defendant pays the plaintiff wages, has control over plain-
tiff's manner of operating, has an economic interest in the relation-
ship or affects plaintiff's access to the job market. This approach
allows a cause of action for interference with employment opportuni-
ties and seems consistent with the statute's purpose.
Today's employment practices are complex and often do not consti-
tute a traditional or immediate employer-employee relationship. Peo-
ple in private businesses may rely extensively on others to broaden
their practice, clientele and reputation in the community. For exam-
ple, a physician relies on a hospital's granting of staff privileges. The
hospital also benefits from such relationship because more hospital
services can be billed and the hospital's reputation is increased by
prominent doctors on its staff. Furthermore, there is no reason why
the coverage of Title VII should not be broadly extended. It makes
little sense to allow people who use independent contractors to dis-
criminate on the bases prohibited by Title VII.166 Under this test, not
every unfavorable action by an employer directed against an individ-
ual can result in a Title VII claim. If there is no effect on an employ-
ment relationship, Title VII is inapplicable. For example, a city's
denial of a license to operate a dance hall to an individual is outside
the scope of the Act.1 67 The plaintiff is not an "employee" of the City;
he is an independent entrepreneur and the denial of such license does
not directly or immediately affect plaintiff's employment relationship
with anyone.1 68
Because Title VII's forbidden discrimination relates to the field of
employment, "there must be a relationship of some kind, actual or
potential, with some employer."1 69 While the relationship need not be
a traditional one, 7 0 there must be some identifiable connection. 171
166. Such expansion of Title VII may result in the protection of independent contrac-
tors who ought not be covered under other labor statutes. These relations, however, are
discussed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 which expressly prohibits discrimination in contract
formation.
167. Darks v. Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1984).
168. Id. at 1042. Another possible limitation would be to allow coverage only to in-
dependent contractors who have no employees of their own, thereby avoiding problems
of such contractors also being employers.
169. LARSON, § 5.21 at 2-9 (1988).
170. Graves, 708 F. Supp. at 235. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
171. If there is no actual employment relationship (i.e., if plaintiff's relationship with
the "principal" is one of independent contractor), Title VII will not apply. This plaintiff,
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Otherwise almost any claim would result in liability. 72
V. Conclusion
Title VII is the most important general statute on employment dis-
crimination. It was enacted to prohibit an employer from discriminat-
ing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Because of the statute's definition of "employee," the judicial interpre-
tations have resulted in illogical and unsatisfactory types of tests.
Congress has amended the term "employee" in other social welfare
legislation because of the uneven outcomes which resulted. Because of
the disparate outcomes regarding Title VII standing, Congress should
clarify the definition of "employee" or define "employed." In the al-
ternative, courts should adopt a consistent method, such as the test
proposed herein.
Valerie L. Jacobson
may have other causes of action available to him or her. For example, the tort of interfer-
ence with contract may be available. This cause of action, however, is more difficult to
prove because it requires proof of intent, whereas such requirement is not an element for
Title VII.
172. See Silver v. KCA Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 1978) (Title VII is directed at
eradication of all discrimination by employers against employees, not eradication of all
discrimination by private individuals.); EEOC v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 122, 463 F.
Supp. 388, 398 (D. Md. 1978) (Title VII is not intended to guarantee a job to every
person regardless of qualifications).
